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Preface 
 
Private equity is a fairly new and still unknown concept in Norway. Both fellow business 
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deals with. My own interest for private equity was aroused during an interesting guest lecture 
from McKinsey about this topic in Corporate Finance at NHH fall 2006. After having gone 
through some former academic studies I found that there were many international studies, but 
just a few describing the Norwegian private equity market. Thus, I had found a topic which 
was both interesting and nearly unexplored in a Norwegian context.  
 
This paper is written as a part of my siviløkonom degree with a major in finance. The paper 
has partly been written in Bergen and partly during my exchange semester in Cologne.  
 
I would like to thank my academic advisor, Mr Carsten Bienz for useful advice in finding an 
appropriate demarcation and provide a red line for my thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
Bergen, June 18th 2007; 
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Kristoffer Gjerland 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and motivation for topic  
2006 was a record- breaking year in the international private equity sector. KKR’s legendary 
$31bn acquisition of RJR Nabisco from 1988 was beaten twice; first when KKR bought 
HCA, the biggest US hospital operator, in a $33bn deal1. Then, another PE giant, Blackstone 
agreed to buy the office building owner Equity Office Properties Trust for $36bn2 These 
record deals definitely moved the attention of investors to private equity funds and confirmed 
the financial strengths these private investment firms are able to accumulate and utilize. 
 
During the last few years, private equity funds have grown stronger and more influential also 
in most parts of Europe. Through active ownership and rationalization of operations these 
funds seek companies which they can run more efficiently and make more profitable. These 
investments are important to any national economy as they nourish employment and growth 
in small- and medium sized companies that are too small to attract public capital. 
 
In Norway private equity is still not a particularly common asset class, but market trends 
indicate an increasing interest in this type of investments. The private equity market in 
Norway has also traditionally not been granted much academic focus. Grünfeld and Jakobsen 
(2006) conducted the largest and most recent study when they compared the value creation in 
400 private equity- financed Norwegian companies with other companies. However, most of 
these companies were supported by venture capitalist rather than buyout funds. 
 
No studies have looked at the increasing number of buyout transactions that have occurred 
recently in Norway, and whether the active ownership of private equity funds create value for 
the acquired companies. Therefore, while “the New Kings of Capitalism”3 conquer the global 
capital markets, I would like to study their impact on the Norwegian market.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Dagens Næringsliv (DN), 25/7- 2006: Raider sykehuskjede 
2
 DN, 21/11- 2006: Oppkjøpsfeber på Wall Street 
3
 The Economist, 25/04- 2004 
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1.2  Aims  
This paper is written bearing in mind two major objectives.  First, it aims to give an up-to-
date and thorough analysis of the Norwegian private equity market, its special characteristics 
and recent market trends. Both the market for venture capital and buyouts will be analyzed; 
however, the latter will primarily be in focus. 
 
Second, the empirical part of this paper looks at a sample of buyouts of Norwegian 
companies. My analysis intends to examine whether there is any relationship between the 
active ownership of private equity firms and changes in the post-buyout performance of the 
acquired companies. The study will be conducted across different performance indicators and 
it will also look into whether the private equity firms’ extensive use of debt also applies to 
Norwegian buyouts. The focus here is on the firm level- performance rather than on the 
performance of the Private Equity funds; the latter having been subject to lots of research.4 
  
1.3 Structure  
This paper will open with a general description of private equity as an alternative asset class 
to traditional public equity and explain how this industry is organized. In the next chapter I 
will give an insight into academic contributions and research in this field, particularly 
regarding the nature of buyouts and its impact on company performance.  
 
The main section of my paper starts with chapter 4.  In this chapter I analyse the Norwegian 
private equity market, evaluate it in a European context and also try to assess future trends in 
the market. This analysis will cover the whole spectre of private equity investments, but the 
emphasis will be on the buyout sector. Chapter 5 then presents the empirical part of my study 
where I will test the post-buyout performance of a sample of Norwegian companies acquired 
by private equity funds between 1997 and 2003. Finally, I will sum up my paper and present 
some concluding words in chapter 6. 
                                                 
4
 E.g. Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Kehoe and Heel (2005), Lerner, Schoar and Wong (2004)  
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Chapter 2  What is Private Equity? 
 
Private equity is a fairly new concept in the Norwegian economy and I therefore regard it 
important to give a general insight to this asset class. I will first look at private equity versus 
other types of equity investments and outline the different types of private equity investments. 
The second part explains how the private equity sector is organized. 
 
2.1 Equity typologies 
Equity can be raised either in public or private markets, as displayed in figure 1 below.  
Public equity is typically offered through the stock markets. When a company wants to enter 
the stock exchange, an initial public offering (IPO) is arranged which enables investors to 
share their capital with the company against a certain degree of ownership interest. These 
markets are well organized and liquid, and if more equity is needed the companies can expand 
their share equity by secondary offerings.  
 
 
Figure 1: The two types of equity 
 
However, only the biggest companies are able to finance their business through public 
markets. Small and medium sized enterprises, which comprise a vast majority of all 
businesses in the economy5, also need capital to develop and expand their businesses. This is 
where private equity finds its capital allocating role. Private equity firms usually invest in 
unquoted companies of small and medium size and at different stages of the business life 
cycle.  
                                                 
5
 Spilling et al. (1998) found that 99,5% of all registered Norwegians enterprises have less than 100 employees. 
Risk Capital Market 
Private Equity Market 
Investments in unquoted companies 
Public Equity Market 
Investments in quoted companies 
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Private equity is a concept given various demarcations in different contexts. Usually, 
however, it may denote two different terms. The broader definition is used in its literate way 
as an umbrella notion for all types of private capital invested in unquoted companies in 
different stages of the life cycle. Secondly, and more concretely, private equity may 
characterize later stage investments only, and therein typically buyouts. Moreover this implies 
a clear distinction between what is regarded private equity and what is venture capital. A good 
example is the European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association, the most influential 
organisation for the European part of the industry. Both by its name and content it 
distinguishes between early stage investments; venture capital, and latter stage buyouts; 
Private Equity. Research in this area uses both the former6 and latter7 definition. Throughout 
this paper I will use the broad definition of private equity which can be split further into 
venture capital and buyouts. 
 
2.1.1 Venture Capital 
Private equity investments can be divided into four subcategories based on which stage the 
companies operate in. Figure 2 below displays the different stages. Seed capital is the initial 
investment that is required for researching, assessing and developing a business concept 
before it has reached start-up. In the Start-up phase private equity investments provide capital 
for product development and early marketing campaigns. Expansion investments are 
conducted in more solid enterprises which need to increase production capacity or working 
capital in order to expand their business and grow further. These first three stages are usually 
termed Venture Capital.  
 
 
Figure 2: The four types of Private Equity Investments 
                                                 
6
 Kaplan, Schoar (2005) 
7
 Wright & Robbie (1998) 
Seed Start-up Expansion Buyout 
Maturity of Company 
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Venture capital has been described as the “business of building business”.8 These investments 
are absolutely crucial for facilitating innovativeness and entrepreneurship in a country. 
Creative thinking is of no worth if there is no capital market willing to invest in the 
development and commercialization of the good ideas. A highly developed and well 
functioning venture capital market is therefore necessary for the emergence and growth of 
small and medium-sized businesses that are too small to yet attract public equity.  
 
2.1.2 Buyouts 
Buyouts represent the last stage of the private equity spectre. This segment focuses on larger 
enterprises that have been in the business for a while, but now need operational and 
managerial assistance to grow further. Buyouts are transactions where the private equity firm 
acquires a company or at least gains a controlling part in it. This secures a major stake in the 
company and gives the private equity firm a certain degree of decision making power. The 
target companies are predominantly private companies, but many buyout funds also have 
financial muscles to acquire public companies. Leveraged buyout (LBO) is the most well-
known buyout variant and is defined as “acquisitions of public companies by private investors 
who finance a large fraction of the purchase price with debt”.9 Buyout funds usually invest in 
mature companies with low growth rate and stable cash-flows, and this reduces the risk 
connected with using considerable amounts of debt to cover the acquisition costs. The 
expected return on equity consequently rises with the increasing amounts of debt.  
 
A Management buyout (MBO) has many of the same features as other buyouts, but in this 
case the managers themselves acquire the company. An institutional buyout (IBO) denotes a 
transaction where a private equity firm acquires a company without prior involvement of 
management. Real world buyouts do not always easily fit into one of these buyout 
typologies.10 Therefore, in the following I will use the term buyout for all kinds of later stage 
acquisitions conducted by private equity firms.  
 
                                                 
8
 Mason and Rohner (2002) 
9
 Brealey and Myers (1996) 
10
 Meier (2005) 
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Buyout funds may have industry-specific or strategic knowledge that enables them to improve 
the profitability of the acquired companies. Private equity firms specialized on buyouts do not 
only supply the companies with capital. More importantly, they take an active ownership role 
through representation on the Board and close observation of management. With a varying 
time horizon for various investments they want to utilize the value creation potential in the 
firm and then sell it with profits. Their aim of improved profitability requires often some 
restructuring of daily business. Rationalisation and outsourcing of different units are 
commonly used instruments, and this may lead to decreasing employment. Therefore LBOs 
are in general feared by trade unions.11 On the other hand, the presence of new, proactive 
owners may save the enterprise from bankruptcy and a much stronger decrease in workforce 
in the long run.  
 
The short-sighted corporate raiders we saw in the LBO business in the 1980s are no longer 
representative for how buyouts are carried out today.12 Buyout firms usually have a horizon of 
several years. Their ownership is terminated when there is little potential left in the firm or 
there is a good exit opportunity. The company is then sold to another private equity firm,13 to 
other investors or listed on the stock exchange.  
 
2.2 How is the PE industry organized 
The nature of the private equity industry entails investors with a certain capital base. This 
asset class is not well accommodated for small, private investors. As we can see in figure 3 
below, most of the funding in private equity is being raised by institutional investors. E.g. 
banks, pension funds, and government agencies may be included under this category, and they 
normally comprise more than half of total funds raised. Institutional investors have a strong 
capital position and want to invest this with a long perspective. Private individuals contributed 
only six per cent of total funds, and this is typically wealthy private investors. Equity 
placements directly into private companies represent the least diversifying and most risky 
investment alternative. This strategy requires a very good knowledge of private equity 
investments and is not suitable for institutional investors with a long investment horizon and 
demanding a fairly stable and safe rate of return. 
                                                 
11
 Fortune (2000) 
12
 Fortune (2000) 
13
 Also known as “secondary buyout” 
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Figure 3: Sources of Private Equity in Europe14 
 
Most of the capital is raised through private equity funds. Each private equity firm often 
manages different funds with different scope and activity. E.g. one of the leading private 
equity firms in the Nordic region, CapMan Private Equity, manages eleven different funds 
which are categorized into four main investment sections.15 Each fund usually has a well 
defined investment mandate which fund managers need to respect in their investment 
activities. This mandate usually includes a certain time frame and a limitation in regard to 
type of industry, life cycle stage, degree of ownership or geography.16 
 
Each fund is administered and managed by a set of fund managers. The investors, which we 
have seen are typically huge institutional entities, invest in these funds through negotiations 
and detailed investment agreements defining regulation of risk, return and control.17 In most 
funds a certain amount of investments is also done by the private equity firms themselves. 
Due to differing tax laws and corporate regulations across countries, there are various 
approaches how to set up private equity firms. In most cases, however, they are structured as 
a partnership where the investors are “limited partners” without any direct control of fund 
management. The managing fund partners are given a “general partner” status, i.e. they have 
unlimited liability for the capital committed to each fund. Private equity firms generate 
                                                 
14
 Source: EVCA (2004) 
15
 CapMan Buyout, Technology, Life Science and Real Estate  (www.capman.com) 
16
 Baker and Viksøy (2006) (p.20) 
17
 Grünfeld and Jakobsen (2007) (p.2) 
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revenues from potential returns on their own investments as well as different fees connected 
to the management of the funds. Another fee called the ”carry” or “carried interest” is a 
percentage of profits that the general partners receive out of the profits of the investments 
made by the fund.18 This percentage is normally 20-25 percent of total annual returns beyond 
a required minimum rate of return. 
 
Instead of investing directly in private equity funds, investors can invest in so-called funds of 
funds. This intermediary form is recognized by its investments in a pool of private equity 
funds instead of directly in the companies. Investing in funds of funds can be an efficient way 
to spread the risk and obtain a well diversified portfolio, especially for investors lacking 
financial or managerial resources. Higher management fees will be offset by decreasing cost 
of selecting and managing direct investments in private equity funds. In Norway, Argentum is 
the only pure fund of fund investor in the private equity sector. The company is government- 
owned and is an important catalyst in the development of an active domestic private equity 
market.19 Figure 4 summarizes the investment patterns in the private equity industry.  
 
 
Figure 4: Investment in Private Equity funds20 
                                                 
18
 Weidig, Kemmerer And Born (2005) 
19
 Argentum’s role in the Norwegian private equity market will be outlined in section 4.2 of this paper. 
20
 Source: www.argentum.no 
Investors Funds of Funds PE Funds 
PE Funds 
PE Funds 
Company 
Company 
Company 
Company 
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Chapter 3 Previous studies/Theoretical background 
 
3.1 Profitability of PE-funds 
This major aim of this paper is to analyse how the active ownership of private equity firms 
influence the post-buyout performance in Norwegian companies. Rather than keeping a firm- 
level focus, most studies conducted by researchers in the last decades have looked at the 
performance of the private equity funds in comparison with alternative investments, typically 
in public markets. Kaplan and Schoan (2005) is the most renowned study of profitability in 
private equity funds. They compared the performance of 746 private equity funds with the 
S&P 500 within the period 1980-2001.21 They found that venture funds were slightly more 
profitable than the S&P 500, while the buyout funds were slightly less profitable than public 
stocks. Furthermore, they found that funds raised in “boom” markets on average perform 
worse than fund established under normal market conditions. 
 
Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) and Phallipou and Zollo (2005) also find that private equity 
funds do not beat the performance of the public markets, on the contrary even underperform 
in some periods. In Europe, Kaserer and Diller (2004) conducted the most recent and 
extensive study with 777 European funds raising capital and investing in the period 1980-
2003. They found that the average returns for European funds were similar to the public 
market. However with a focus on funds raised after 1989, the study gave significantly higher 
returns for the private equity firms. This implies that the 90s were an attractive decade for 
private equity investors in Europe. 
 
Kaplan (1989) contributes with an extensive and renowned firm-level study in this area. He 
studied the effects on operating performance and value of 76 major MBOs of public 
companies between 1980 and 1986. With a post-buyout time frame of three years he found 
that the companies experienced increases in operating income and net cash flow. Capital 
expenditures decreased in the same period. According to his study, the most plausible reason 
for these operating changes is due to better incentives for management rather than cuts in 
                                                 
21
 S&P 500 is the Standard & Poor stock index which includes a representative sample of 500 leading companies 
in leading industries of the U.S. economy. 
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employment or asymmetric information between shareholders and management before the 
MBO. 
 
3.2 Active ownership generating company profitability 
Active ownership is the mantra for private equity investors, and several studies have looked at 
the relationship between degree of impact from new owners and performance of the acquired 
firm. Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Kehoe and Heel (2005) and Lerner, Schoar and Wong 
(2004) find that the spread in fund returns is more persistent than in other asset classes. With 
other words, some private equity funds are performing better than other funds year after year 
and there seems to be a link between which private equity firms take control in a company 
and the post-transaction performance of it. Thus, the way fund managers select target 
companies, take an active role as owners in them and restructure and manage their business 
determine to a great extent the company’s output. Figure 5 displays the persistent relationship 
between an initial fund’s performance and the performance of the follow-up fund. 
 
 
Figure 5: Persistence of returns between first fund and follow up-funds22 
 
Recent McKinsey research in this area has found further interesting results.23 Among several 
findings they found that the most successful fund managers devote more of their time to get to 
know the company and the internal process in the early stages of the transactions. In the best 
performing deals, these partners spent more than half of their time working on the acquired 
                                                 
22
 Source: CS Private Equity/ McKinsey 
23
 McKinsey Quarterly (2005) 
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company during the 100 first days after the buyout. Furthermore, in the same period they 
were meeting with top executives nearly every day. For the lower-performing deals, on the 
other hand, partners from the private equity firm only spent about 20% of their time working 
with that specific company. Another feature with the best private equity funds was that if they 
wanted to change parts of management they conducted these changes early in the process. In 
83% of the best performing deals the management team was strengthened before closing. For 
the worst performing companies only 33% of these changes were done in an early phase. 
 
3.3 Capital structure 
In a theoretical presentation of capital structure the extensive work of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) is an inevitable part. They showed that capital structure does not matter in perfect 
markets, i.e. in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information. Thus, the 
total value of a firm is given by its real assets, not by the securities it issues.24 Real life 
markets are not perfect and decisions on capital structure do matter in many cases. Still, the 
work of Miller and Modigliani is crucial in order to understand how various market 
imperfections determine the optimal capital structure in a firm.  
 
Private equity firms leverage their deals first of all because this increases the expected returns 
on their investments. Miller and Modigliani agree with this logic, but they find that the 
increased risk exactly offsets the increase in expected returns. However, some important 
implications of debt financing are neglected due to their assumption of perfect markets. First 
of all, debt offers the possibility of tax shields. Interest paid to debt holders is tax- deductible 
and this increases firm value. Therefore, the value of a highly levered firm depends to a large 
extent upon the amount of tax shields.25 On the other hand, leveraged companies face 
increased probability of financial distress and bankruptcy. This represents a cost for the firm 
and increases the risk of the investment.  
 
Another market imperfection, asymmetric information between management and owners, 
may be partly solved by leveraging the firm. Many argue that debt has a disciplinary effect on 
managers and reduce the problem of free cash flow, i.e. management is less likely to destroy 
firm value by investing in bad projects or luxurious goods. Grinstein (2003) finds that there is 
                                                 
24
 Brealey and Myers (1996) 
25
 Schultze (2004) 
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a relation between the way firms choose their capital structure and the degree of disciplinary 
actions needed towards management. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Bergløf and von 
Thadden (1994), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and other studies emphasize the active role of 
debt holders in disciplining the manager. 
 
Recent research has found that along with a growing buyout sector the use of leverage has 
also increased during the last few years. In the average deals from 2000-2002, debt was equal 
to four times EBITDA (Earnings before income taxes, depreciation and amortization) in the 
company. By the end of 2005 the equivalent number was more than 5.6. Some recent deals 
even see debt-to-EBITDA ratios exceed 10.26 
                                                 
26
 Business Week 27/2-2006: Buyout Mania’s Mountain of Debt 
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Chapter 4  The Norwegian Private Equity Market 
 
4.1 Background 
Private equity is not widely used in Norway as an instrument to finance small- and medium-
sized businesses. Compared to other European countries the domestic market for both venture 
capital and buyouts has traditionally been underdeveloped. The first private equity 
transactions in Norway were carried out in the early 1980s.27 Towards the end of the decade 
this market was struck as strongly by the global financial crisis as the public stock markets. 
Since then there has been a steady, but relatively slow growth in the number of private equity 
firms and committed capital.  
 
During the last decade the Norwegian authorities have realised the importance of stimulating 
a well functioning and competitive private equity market, and have taken a more active role in 
facilitating and encouraging investments in risk capital. Various state funds and other 
government institutions were created to boost the interest for private equity placements. This 
campaign led to certain results, especially in the area of venture capital, and today Norway 
has a fairly well developed capital market for companies in the early stage. In important 
national industries as oil and gas, the maritime sector and IT, we have seen several successful 
companies emerge lately with the help of venture capitalists. Also the activity in the buyout 
sector is on the increase. 
 
4.2 The role of Argentum 
The establishment of the government-owned investment company, Argentum, in 2001 is 
probably the most influential recent contribution to a more efficient domestic private equity 
market from the side of the authorities. The aim of this institution is “through its investments, 
to facilitate access to international venture capital, and to be a driving force in the 
development of an internationally competitive private equity environment in Norway.”28 
 
                                                 
27
 Econ Analyse (2004) 
28
 Direct quote from www.argentum.no, English version 
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Argentum operates as a fund to fund company and therefore directs all its resources to private 
equity funds instead of investing directly in companies. Through such an investment strategy 
it achieves two very important objectives as a state institution.29 First of all, the principle of 
“arm length distance” implies that Argentum always keeps a certain distance to the projects 
they are involved in. Only the equity funds they allocate money to will have any significant 
impact on the companies they invest in. This is a cornerstone in Argentums’s investment 
philosophy as it ensures private integrity for the funds; hence their investment decisions are 
solely made on the basis of business principles. Second, Argentum will always have a 
minority share in any fund. This secures a larger private than public stake in any funds and 
avoids any political influence on investment decisions.  
 
Argentum intends to be a responsible and long-term oriented investor. All its investments are 
done in funds which have a seven to ten years’ perspective. Today Argentum has spread its 
investments over 21 various funds. A majority of them are Norwegian venture capital and 
private equity funds while some are Nordic funds. Until now it has committed NOK 2.1 bn to 
Norwegian funds and about NOK 1 bn to other Nordic funds. This amount is nearly equally 
divided between venture investments and latter stage investments.  
 
Argentum has had remarkable returns on its investments the last five years. In the period 
1.1.2002 – 31.12.2006 Argentum had an annual rate of return on its investments on 35.6%. Its 
buyout funds achieved returns of 46.2% while the venture funds generated annual returns of 
25.4%. Oslo Stock Exchange had an annual return of 21.4% in the same period. It must be 
noted here that private equity investments have a higher risk profile than public investments. 
On the other hand, table 1 on the following page reveals that Argentum does not only perform 
formidably in comparison to public investments at home. In the same five year-period 
Argentum beats even the best quartile of European private equity funds, and this applies to 
both its venture and buyout investments.  
 
                                                 
29
 Argentum annual report 2002 
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Numbers per 31.12.2006 Argentum European funds 
Best quartile 
European funds 
Average 
Venture funds 25.4% 23.5% 6.4% 
Buyout funds 46.2% 37.6% 13.7% 
Private Equity aggregated 35.6% 29.1% 10.3% 
 
Table 1: Returns for Argentum compared to European funds30 
 
There is no doubt that Argentum has had exceptional returns on its investment since the start 
in fall 2001. The high returns can partly be explained by a Norwegian economy which in 
general has been bullish the last five years. As stated above, Oslo Stock Exchange generated 
average annual returns of 21.4% in the period 2002-2005. On the other hand, its performance 
relative to both other domestic asset classes and its European counterparts clearly indicates its 
diligent pre-analysis and selection of the right funds. Argentum does not only invest the 
money of Norwegian citizens rationally and with high returns, it also stimulates the private 
equity and venture capital markets through its broad presence. Furthermore, it has a 
significant indirect impact through its funds on the Norwegian small- and medium- sized 
industry. By the end of 2006 Argentum’s funds had invested in more than 100 companies 
with a total number of 14 000 employees.31 
 
4.3 Fund activity 
The 2006 Activity Survey for Private Equity and Venture Capital32 found that the Norwegian 
market now includes 56 active companies which administer a total of 85 funds. 15 new funds 
were established in 2006, and these funds raised NOK 11.4 bn in new capital last year. 
Norwegian funds now manage a capital pool of about NOK 45 bn. Nearly half of this is free 
capital that the companies have accumulated in order to keep a flexible and proactive 
investment approach. 
 
Only 13 out of 85 funds operate in the buyout segment. Buyout funds are typically much 
bigger than venture funds, but also in terms of raised capital the buyout sector is rather small 
and accounts for less than one third of total raised capital. A total of NOK 11.7 bn. was raised 
in Norwegian buyout funds by the end of 2006. This reveals the fact that the Norwegian 
                                                 
30
 Press release: Argentum med sterkt resultat for 2006 (Bergen, 30/5- 2007) 
31
 The Norwegian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association (NVCA) 
32
 Produced for NVCA and Argentum by Menon Business Economics 
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private equity market still is centred on venture capital investments rather than buyouts and 
restructuring of companies. Figure 6 gives an overview of how the risk capital is distributed 
across the different investment stages. It also shows the huge amount of capital which is 
reserved for later investments, especially in the buyout sector where free capital comprises 
nearly double as much as already invested capital.  
 
 
Figure 6: Invested and free capital. MNOK. 33(2006 Activity Survey) 
 
There are today ten Norwegian private equity firms which operate in the buyout and latter 
stage sector, and they manage altogether 13 funds. In table 2 below an overview of these firms 
and funds is presented.34 It is worth noting that five out of 13 buyout funds were established in 
2006, and this implies a certain increasing trend in the direction of buyouts also in Norway.  
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 The diligent reader will notice that total funds displayed in table 2 are higher than the 11.7 bn stated in the 
2006 Activity Survey. This is expected as table 1 contains updated figures from June 1st, 2007 and we must 
therefore allow for possible increases in the capital base of the funds in the first five months of 2007. Fund 
figures are retrieved from the firm’s home pages and from VentureXpert. 
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Private Equity Firm Funds Established Capital base (Bn NOK )
1 Altaria Private Equity Altaria Private Equity (former Foinco Invest) 2000 0,5
2 Borea Borea Opportunity 2002 N/A
3 Ferd Private Equity Ferd Private Equity Fund I 2004 1,97
Ferd Private Equity Fund II 2006 4,25
4 FSN Capital Partners FSN Capital I 2001 0,3
FSN Capital II 2006 1,2
5 Furuholmen Private Equity Furuholmen Private Equity 2006 0,3
6 HitechVision Private Equity HitecVision Private Equity IV 2006 1,82
7 Norgesinvestor Norgesinvestor III 2001 0,32
Norgesinvestor IV 2006 0,6
8 Norvestor Equity Norvestor IV 2004 1,15
9 Reiten & Co Reiten & Co Capital Partners VI 2005 0,89
10 Verdane Capital Advisors Verdane Kapital V 2005 0,77
14,07SUM
 
 
Table 2: Norwegian firms and funds in the buyout sector per May 2007 
 
Ferd Private Equity is the major Norwegian player in the buyout sector. With its two funds 
covering nearly half of the total raised capital in Norway, it has a solid financial fundament 
for acquisitions in large and medium-sized companies. Ferd has conducted eight buyouts 
since the start and three of the companies have already been exited. The acquisitions of 
Collett Pharma, Pronova Biocare and Handicare are the most well-known transactions. Ferd is 
a good example of how Norwegian private equity firms may extend their activities and attract 
international attention through high performance. Fund I has been one of the most profitable 
funds in Europe the last two years, and this made the interest for a second fund 
overwhelming. All the investors from the first fund also committed funds for Fund II. In 
addition, European investors committed about 25 per cent of the new funds.35 
 
4.4 Norway relative to Europe 
A study conducted on behalf of Argentum in 200436 compared the Norwegian private equity 
market with other European countries. This study identified four main areas in which the 
Norwegian PE-market clearly differs from other risk capital markets. We will go through 
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these four specific features in the following and post some plausible explanations for the 
different aspects. 
 
First, the Norwegian market is regarded rather “young” and the amount of raised funds is 
small relative to the general patterns of the homeland economy. While Norwegian Private 
Equity funds invested less than NOK 4 bn in 2006, the Swedish private equity investors 
invested NOK 20 bn. Norway has relative to its GDP an investment level which is lower than 
all the other Nordic countries as well as the European average. Figure 7 shows private equity 
and venture capital investments as share of GDP in Norway and in three comparable 
countries.37  
 
 
Figure 7: PE and Venture Capital Investments as share of GDP 
 
Second, institutional investors, e.g. pension funds and insurance companies are not so 
dominant in the domestic private equity market. In Norway only 40 per cent of committed 
capital derives from this investor class, while in the neighbouring country Sweden 
institutional investors account for 80 per cent. Also in most other Western countries these 
investors play a major role. A possible reason for this feature may be that the pension funds in 
Norway are relatively small due to a comprehensive government pension system. Another 
reason might derive from legal restrictions which are stricter in Norway than in most other 
countries, e.g. there are certain limits for how much each investor can invest in a private 
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equity fund. Institutional investors usually have a huge capital base, and therefore seek huge 
shares in the funds.   
 
Third, foreign investors seem not to be very interested in Norwegian private equity funds. In 
2002 international investors only accounted for 5 per cent of total committed capital in 
Norway. Once again Sweden faces a totally different reality with about 80% international 
presence in the same period, while the European average is about 50%. Norwegian funds may 
be relatively unattractive because they lack necessary “track records” and are regarded as too 
small for the normal scope of huge international investors. Hence, private equity investments 
in Norway appear to be concerned with much uncertainty. In the public market, on the 
contrary, foreign investors account for about 60-70% of all transactions on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange.38 Furthermore, foreign investors may choose to invest directly in Norwegian 
enterprises instead of through Norwegian funds. Figure 8 shows the lack of international 
exposure in Norwegian funds compared with various other Western countries. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The share of domestic and foreign investment in Norway and other Western countries39 
 
The last and perhaps most striking feature with the Norwegian private equity industry is the 
underdeveloped buyout market. As we can see in figure 9 below, Norway has a vast majority 
of its capital directed into venture projects. In the Nordic countries and particularly in the rest 
of Europe the situation is rather opposite. More than double as much capital were allocated to 
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buyout activities than to early stage investments in 2003 in Europe, and this trend is even 
stronger today. Nearly 80% of funds raised in 2005 were intended to fund buyouts.40 
 
 
Figure 9: VC and Buyout investments in the PE-markets in Norway, the Nordic region and Europe 
 
 
Reasons for the small buyout share in the Norwegian market can be a combination of the 
three formerly mentioned points. First of all, Norway still has a fairly young and relatively 
small risk capital market. Since buyouts normally are radically more capital-intensive than 
venture investments41, private equity markets are likely to start with high degree of early stage 
investments and then gradually increase the capital flow into the larger buyout market. This 
evolutionary rhetoric has an even stronger position here as Norwegian government 
regulations and other general conditions seem to restrict the dominant role of the large, 
institutional investors. Furthermore, the lack of international exposure on the funding side of 
Norwegian private equity funds lead to smaller funding and may have particularly severe 
implications for the buyout market. 
 
4.5 Market trends 
The analysis of the Norwegian private equity sector has among other things highlighted that 
investments in the buyout sector are small relative to venture capital investments. However, 
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general market trends show that the buyout sector attracts increasing interest from both 
Norwegian and international investors and currently grows faster than the venture capital 
sector. Ferd Private Equity’s new fund that was established in fall 2006 is not only by far the 
largest fund ever in Norway, but marks also a milestone in terms of international exposure on 
the investor side.  
 
Five out of total 13 buyout funds in Norway were established last year, and this further 
indicates the positive trend for the buyout sector. Investors move their capital between 
markets in response to changes in expected returns for a certain risk. The investors see that 
the Norwegian buyout funds in the last couple of years have received high returns. It therefore 
seems like the Norwegian market finally has evolved from its adolescence and now operates 
in a more mature phase with a certain track record and reputation that attracts domestic and 
foreign capital.  
 
The amount of free capital in Norwegian buyout funds is also remarkably high. This confirms 
the strong confidence investors have developed in this asset class while the funds wait for 
good buyout candidates. Most of the free capital is expected to finance buyouts of large, 
mature Norwegian companies, including public companies.42 
Institutional investors still play a less significant active role in the Norwegian market than 
they do in other Western markets and this pattern seems not to change in near future. Apart 
from this, however, the Norwegian buyout market seems to be in a positive trend. Even 
though the Norwegian private equity market today is lagging behind the Nordic countries and 
Sweden in particular, the fundamental attributes of the capital markets does not differ much 
between them. Norway is one of the most prosperous countries in the world measured by 
GDP per capita43, has world-class enterprises in numerous sectors and should therefore be 
able to offer a more competitive private equity market in the years to come. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical study of the Norwegian buyout market 
 
This section presents the empirical part of my paper. One of the main findings from the 
analysis of the Norwegian private equity market in the previous chapter was the 
underdevelopment of the buyout sector. I already posted some plausible general reasons for 
this market trend, but in the following I will keep a firm- level focus and delve into some 
specific characteristics of buyout transactions. A set of 16 buyouts of Norwegian firms from 
1997 to 2003 will be presented. The acquired companies will be analysed across different 
performance parameters in order to examine if there are attributes with the post-buyout 
performance of Norwegian firms that can be linked to the active ownership of private equity 
firms.  
 
5.1 Data Collection 
In the data collection phase it is first of all important to limit the scope of the research. Even if 
the Norwegian buyout market does not comprise many transactions in the first place, various 
criteria needed to be fulfilled in order ensure a certain degree of standardization and 
comparability between the data.  
 
In this process I was faced with a certain trade-off between the quantity and quality aspect of 
the data. The quality and reliability of all figures is certainly a cornerstone in this research, but 
on the other side some criteria were made a little more flexible in order to gain a broader 
research material. E.g. the list of buyout transactions revealed huge differences between the 
biggest and smallest acquired companies. I considered this wide distribution as acceptable, 
and in fact in small firms the owners might be able to influence management and daily 
operations more than in large enterprises. Consequently, I set a relatively low limit for the 
size of the target company in order to increase the number of observations.  
 
To search for buyout deals I used the global electronic databases Zephyr44 and 
VentureXpert45. While the former has a deal focus and therefore was useful for getting an 
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overview of the transactions in the period, the latter includes thorough information about the 
private equity funds and the companies involved in the deals. The two databases were also 
used to mutually confirm facts and figures related to these deals. The data collection was 
conducted with the following criteria for all transactions: 
 
1) The transaction was completed in the period 1997 – 2003. 
2) The private equity firm acquired minimum 50% of the shares in the target company 
and consequently possessed a dominant ownership. 
3) Acquirer must be a private equity firm/fund which focuses on the latter stage/buyout 
stage 
4) The target company is Norwegian and has a turnover in the year of transaction of 
more than NOK 15 millions.  
 
In past research they have focused on deal size as one criterion, e.g. Kaplan, (1989). It 
appeared that deal size information is not available for all observations, and turnover was 
therefore used as a measure for company size. If we apply the assumptions that buyout 
companies operate with relatively stable cash flows and exist in a mature stage of the life 
cycle, turnover will to some extent also reflect the size of the deal. 
 
The time frame was chosen in compliance with the purpose of the empirical part of my study 
which is to indicate whether the active presence and involvement of private equity owners has 
any significant impact on the performance of the target companies. In order to assess this 
aspect it is necessary to look at the companies’ performance both before and after the change 
of ownership. Since accounting information is hard to retrieve for periods more than ten years 
back in time and the Norwegian buyout market is fairly young, 1997 was set as the last year 
of acceptable observations. Furthermore, in order to evaluate post-buyout effects on the 
acquired firms across financial parameters, at least two years of accounting information 
following the transaction year was needed. Most accounting figures from Norwegian firms for 
2006 are expected to be made public after completion of this paper, i.e. 2003 had to be the last 
acceptable transaction year. 
 
The buyout deals fulfilling the criteria above were explored for accounting information both 
before and after transaction. This information was retrieved from The Register of Company 
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Accounts at the Brønnøysund Register Centre46 through the electronic database Ravn 
foretaksinformasjon. Some of the target companies appeared to be strongly restructured by 
the new owners after the buyout transaction, and this made the search for reliable data more 
complicated. For some of the companies it was not possible to find comparable post-buyout 
data and this resulted in a reduced number of total observations. In the end I found 16 
companies with comparable pre- and post- buyout accounting data and these companies 
constitute the foundation of the empirical part in this paper. 
 
5.2 Sample description 
The 16 companies comprise a very heterogeneous sample reflecting both different company 
sizes and a wide range of industries.47 Two out of these 16 companies were bought in public 
takeovers, with other words bought as public companies and then delisted from Oslo Stock 
Exchange. All the other companies were bought as private companies. As we can see in figure 
10 below, the most distinct feature with the sample is the high number of observations in the 
last year of the period. Nine observations, more than half of the sample, are in fact 
transactions that were completed in 2003. This confirms a trend I also noticed in the data 
collection phase. Not only 2003 was an active year for buyouts in Norway, also the last 
couple of years saw many large deals where well-known Norwegian companies were bought 
by private equity funds. E.g. Jøtul, Frontier Drilling, Arcus-Gruppen, VIA Travel Group and 
Nille all got new private equity owners in the period 2004 - 2006. Furthermore, all the four 
buyouts conducted by Norwegian private equity firms in the sample were also completed in 
2003.  
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Figure 10: Distribution of sample buyouts 
 
Another important feature with this sample is the high representation of foreign private equity 
investors. Only 25% of the deals were completed by Norwegian private equity firms. Swedish 
and British private equity funds have been relatively active in this period, while the other 
deals are carried out by other European private equity funds. The acquisition of Telenor 
Media by the US Private Equity giant Texas Pacific Group in 1999  is the only non- European 
presence in this sample. This is, however, the largest deal in the sample and definitely one of 
the most well-known private equity buyouts in the Norwegian market.  
 
The overview of all 16 companies and details concerning the deals can be found in Appendix 
I. In table 3 below summary statistics for size and profitability of the buyout companies in the 
year of transaction is presented. A fundamental higher mean than the observed median in the 
financial figures indicate a few, large enterprises in the sample which strongly influences the 
mean statistic. The median will therefore be used rather than the mean in our calculations 
because it provides a more representative analysis of the sample. The standard deviation is 
also relatively high, and further proves a formidable spread in the observations.  
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 Median Mean Std.dev N 
Annual sales (1000 NOK) 294 013 404 477 379 992 16 
EBIT 18 479 54 537 111 912 16 
EBIT-margin 7,61 14,74 22,41 16 
Equity-margin 0,37 0,39 0,21 13 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of sample 
 
 
5.3 Method 
This analysis focuses on three different operating variables and one capital structure variable. 
These variables are: 
 
1) Turnover (Annual sales) 
2) Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) 
3) EBIT-margin (EBIT/ Turnover) 
4) Equity margin (equity/total capital) 
 
The three first financial figures will give an indication of the performance of the companies. 
Turnover, or annual sales, is the most appropriate figure to examine whether the companies 
grow or downsize the business after the buyout. EBIT gives an absolute number of the 
earnings a business gain during a year before interest and taxes, while the EBIT-margin gives 
a relative performance figure which is appropriate for comparison across the companies. The 
equity margin is included here to find out whether there are any changes in capital structure in 
the acquired companies. As I outlined in chapter 3, private equity firms tend to use a high 
portion of debts in their acquired companies in order to increase returns on investment.  
 
For all parameters I tried to find figures from two years before the transaction year until three 
years after transaction. In my research t denotes the year the deal was completed. The 
transaction might be conducted very early or very late in the year, and the radical changes in 
financial parameters due to the new owners are not apparent before after the transaction year. 
Consequently, the time frame for each company in my research is from t-2 to t+3. Since the 
newest deals are from 2003 they will only have financial figures from the two years after 
transaction.  
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The three parameters will be analyzed across four different time dimensions. The change from 
year t-2 to year t-1 represents the financial development of the companies before the buyout 
and gives an impression of their performance before the shift of ownership. Then the financial 
year before the transaction, t-1, will be compared with each of the three years following after 
the buyout. These figures will first of all find out whether the new, active ownership of 
private equity funds has lead to any significant changes in financial performance. 
Furthermore, they might also indicate whether the strongest impact occurs very shortly after 
the transaction (t+1) or the new owners need more time to be able to do changes that 
influence the financial results (t+2/t+3).  
 
The analysis described above gives an important insight into the changes in annual sales and 
earnings before and after buyout if we regard the 16 companies isolated. However, the role of 
general market conditions and industry conditions should not be neglected in this context. 
These elements might influence our figures, and in order to reduce general market and 
industry effects I will also include an industry-adjusted analysis. Three companies which are 
comparable across both industry and size have been identified for each buyout company. The 
industry classification of Brønnøysund Register of Company Accounts was used also for this 
purpose. The industry- adjusted change equals the percentage change in the variable for the 
buyout company minus the median percentage change over the relevant period for the three 
firms from the same industry. 
 
In order to assess the reliability of the financial figures it is necessary to apply a statistical tool 
for testing their significance. The paired t-test is commonly used to check whether the 
members of a pair differ in size, and this is also the intention for this sample. However, this 
test requires that the distribution of the differences follow a normal distribution.48 For our data 
we cannot assume this normal distribution and we therefore need another approach. Several 
similar studies, e.g. Kaplan (1989) and Opler (1992), have used the Wilcoxon signed rank test 
to test the significance of the data, and this method will also be applied for this sample. In 
order to keep a careful and conservative approach a two-tailed test is applied. This implicitly 
assumes the following null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis: 
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 H0: Post-buyout performance variables equal pre-buyout performance variables.   
 H1: Post-buyout performance variables do not equal pre-buyout performance variables 
 
 
5.4 Analysis / Findings 
5.4.1 Operating performance 
The changes in the operating performance variables annual sales, EBIT and EBIT-margin are 
given in table 4 below.49 
FROM YEAR i TO YEAR j  
 
t-2 to t-1 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+2 t-1 to t+2 
A. Annual sales N=11 N=16 N=16 N=7 
 Percentage change 
(median) 
25,93 13,36* 25,05* 40,59 
B EBIT N=10 N=16 N=16 N=7 
 
Percentage change 
(median) 
34,45 121,26** 96,67*** 6,36 
C EBIT/SALES N=10 N=16 N=16 N=7 
 Percentage change 
(median) 
9,84 103,04**** 71,74**** 29,50 
 
Table 4: Changes in operating performance 
 
 *  Significant at 1% level 
**  Significant at 2% level 
*** Significant at 5% level 
****  Significant at 10% level 
 
Table 4 indicates that the periods with relatively many observations in general appear to be 
systematically more significant than those with fewer observations. This complies with 
statistic rationale and is really evident here. Panel A shows that the median increases in 
annual sales are 13.16%, 25.06% and 40.59% from t-1 to the three post-buyout years, 
however, only the two first of these numbers are significant. This indicates that the private 
equity firms tend not to restructure and divest the business too much, but rather stimulate 
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further sales growth in the companies. Whether the increase in post-buyout annual sales is due 
to organic growth, acquisitions or a combination of both is this paper not able to tell.   
 
It may also be noted here that the companies on average seem to grow formidably in the year 
before transaction. This figure is not significant for this sample, but I would generally 
emphasize the importance of also taking the pre-buyout figures into account. 
 
The companies seem to grow further after the buyout, and in panel B we see that this growth 
also generates increased returns. EBIT grows with 121.6% and 96.67% from t-1 to t+1 and 
t+2. These significant findings reveal that the profitability in these companies is boosted 
already in the first couple of years after the buyout. A little surprisingly, the year subsequent 
to the buyout year offered a stronger performance than the next. This might also be explained 
by general market trends or the fact that the third observation in panel B is less significant 
than the second. The other numbers are not significant at all and require therefore no 
explanation. 
 
The EBIT-margin presents the relative performance of the companies and is based on the two 
variables above. Panel C shows the same trend as in panel B. The companies substantially 
increase earnings relative to annual sales from t-1 to t+1, while the next year presents a 
downturn. It must be noted that these figures are only significant within a 10% significance 
level which is beyond acceptable significance levels, even for two- tailed tests. 
 
5.4.2 Industry- adjusted operating performance 
To control for general market trends and industry effects I present the industry- adjusted 
changes in the variables in Table 5.50 
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FROM YEAR i TO YEAR j  
 
t-2 to t-1 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+2 t-1 to t+2 
A. Annual sales N=11 N=16 N=16 N=7 
 Industry.-adjusted 
percentage change 
(median) 
12,88 13,45**** 29,13**** 1,07 
B EBIT N=10 N=16 N=16 N=7 
 
Industry-adjusted 
percentage change 
(median) 
-3,39 65,29 50,76 15,07 
C EBIT/SALES N=10 N=16 N=16 N=7 
 Industry-adjusted 
percentage change 
(median) 
19,97 2,62 23,21 30,87 
 
Table 5: Industry- adjusted operating performance 
 
**** Significant at 10% level 
 
The industry-adjusted figures are with a few exceptions not significant. Annual sales show 
significant increases from year t-1 to t+1 and t+2. The increase in panel A for both these time 
periods nearly coincides with what we found in table 3. This indicates that the economy-wide 
and industry effects were minimal or neutralized each other for this sample. It might be 
tempting to assume that this logic also can be applied for the other performance variables that 
were significant in table 3. However, we have no statistically significant results showing that 
industry effects to a small degree influence the other variables apart from the two periods 
described above. It must be noted that these two figures are only significant at a 10% 
significance level and, thus, must be assessed in a reserved and careful manner. 
 
The main reason for the non-significant results is probably that for each buyout firm only 
three companies represent the industry comparison. There might be huge differences in 
performance parameters for these companies and this will be strongly reflected in this 
industry-adjusted analysis. The number of observed buyout companies is also fairly low and 
increase the probability of insignificant results. 
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5.4.3 Capital structure 
In this section I will examine whether the private equity firms in the Norwegian market 
actively leverage their purchases and, thus, increase the debt ratio in the capital structure. 
Table 6 below presents the development in the equity level of the buyout companies both 
before and after the buyout.51 
 
Equity-margin (Eq/tot.cap) 
 t+3 T+2 t+1 t t-1 t-2 
N= 7 16 16 13 12 8 
Average of 
observations: 0,32 0,31 0,34 0,39 0,37 0,46 
Median of 
observations: 0,26 0,26 0,32 0,37 0,32 0,45 
 
Table 6: Mean and median equity-margin 
 
The figure reveals that the capital structure does not change much after the emerge of new 
owners. We can see a small decrease in equity level from the pre-buyout level to the post-
buyout level, but my calculations show that these changes are not at all significant. This 
finding does not concur with the normal characteristics of buyouts.  
 
In order to find any plausible explanations for this result it is necessary to look at the pre-
buyout equity levels. The pre-buyout debt levels are unusually high in my sample. Already in 
year t-1 the observed companies have a capital structure with nearly double as much debt as 
equity. Even though some private equity firms operate with very high debt-equity ratios this 
high initial debt level might give the private equity owners doubts whether the companies 
should be further leveraged; hence financial distress and bankruptcy costs discussed in the 
theoretical part. 
 
5.5 Critical reflections 
The findings from my empirical study presented above require some critical comments. First 
of all, the general number of observations is too small to generate any real truths about how 
the active ownership of private equity firms influences the post-buyout performance of 
companies. Norway has a small buyout market which is at an early stage and this influences 
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the magnitude of the sample. Even if my analysis has shown a distinct upward trend in the 
number and size of buyout funds and buyout transactions the last couple of years, the relevant 
time frame of this analysis does only to a small extent take this positive effect into account. 
 
The financial figures are all retrieved from reliable, public sources. However, all these figures 
might contain important elements that I have not taken into consideration. E.g. the annual 
sales in a company might rise or sink considerably in the post-buyout phase because the new 
owners are actively acquiring other firms or strongly divest the business. This is necessary to 
operate the business more profitability in the long run, but in the short run it might give 
extreme positive or negative deviations from pre-buyout sales which strongly influences my 
findings.  
 
Furthermore, the time frame here gives a short post-buyout perspective. Many private equity 
funds own their companies in several years before they exit them, and in my study the 
majority of the transactions do not even have more than two years of financial figures after 
buyout. Even though this gives a certain indication of the short-run change in firm 
performance, it does not convey changes in operating performance that typically might be 
much more distinct in the long run. 
 
5.6 Suggested further studies 
Since the scope of a siviløkonom thesis has certain limits and the current trend in the 
Norwegian private equity market makes future studies more interesting than ever, I would like 
to present some ideas for further studies in this field. The Norwegian private equity market is 
still in a young phase compared to its European and American counterparts and this has put 
some restrictions on my access to extensive, appropriate empirical data. I strongly believe a 
similar study should be conducted in five to ten years which would be able to gather a larger 
sample of valid data.  
 
My empirical study did only take a few financial variables into account. There are certainly 
many other performance indicators that can be used to gain a broader insight. What would 
perhaps be even more interesting is to search for the plausible reason for typical changes in 
post-buyout performance variables. Redundancies, degree of active ownership, board 
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changes, etc. might be aspects that give an answer to why and not only how post-buyout 
company performance tends to change with the new active ownership of private equity firms. 
 
More and more private equity firms also exit their investments by making their companies go 
public. Twelve Norwegian companies were quoted on Oslo Stock Exchange in 2005 and 
many listings were also done last year.52 This opens up many possibilities for further studies. 
Most interesting, in my eyes, is it to compare the performance of the companies during 
private equity ownership and their performance after they go public. The increasing amount 
of private equity listings in Norway makes this a very exciting area of future research.   
 
These are some examples of potential future empirical studies in the area of private equity. In 
some years similar studies can be conducted with more observational substance and, thus, 
greater academic validity than what was possible for the empirical part of this paper.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
Norway has traditionally been the least developed private equity market in the Nordic region, 
and particularly the buyout capital markets have suffered from lack of sufficient funding and 
expertise. Underlying macroeconomic and industry-specific conditions state that there should 
be no huge differences between Norway and other Western countries. This paper has given a 
thorough analysis of the latest characteristics of the Norwegian private equity sector and 
many of today’s market indicators point towards a growing and more competitive risk capital 
environment.  
  
Norwegian markets currently attract increasing interest from both domestic and international 
investors.  The number of Norwegian buyout funds increased from eight to 13 last year and 
the largest fund committed more than double as much capital as the largest fund in 2005. Also 
my empirical studies show that the investment activity in Norway is increasing significantly. 
More than half of the buyout deals in the sample were done in the last observation year, 2003. 
Furthermore, all the four buyouts conducted by Norwegian private equity firms in the sample 
were also completed in 2003. 
 
The necessary time frame of my empirical study of the post-buyout performance of acquired, 
Norwegian companies makes the sample only partly reflect the recent growth in buyout 
activity; hence, the number of observations is limited. What I found from my studies is that 
the companies show substantial growth rates both in the first and second year after buyout. 
This growth is maintained also in the comparison with its industry peers for the same period. 
The profitability measured by EBIT and the EBIT-margin seems to increase after the buyout 
compared to pre-buyout levels, but these figures are considerably less significant than for the 
annual sales. I find no significant evidence that companies acquired by private equity firms 
outcompete other companies in the industry in terms of operating performance. A little 
surprisingly, I do not find that private equity firms increase leverage in their target companies 
after buyout in the Norwegian market either. 
 
The results of my Norwegian private equity study differ to a certain extent from what 
previous international research has found. I believe those differences result from the 
fundamentals of my observation sample rather than explained by peculiarities with the 
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Norwegian market. This applies particularly to the finding that capital structure in Norwegian 
companies does not seem to change after buyouts. However, if the Norwegian private equity 
market continues to evolve like it has done the last few years a study resembling this one 
should be conducted in some years. A bigger and more extensive observation sample might 
provide the answers to the questions I asked, but the scope of my work was not able to offer a 
significant truth to. 
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Appendix I 
 
 
No Target company Industry Quoted Private Equity firm Country Year Ownership
1 Lindorff Holding AS
Financial services  + customer and 
outsourcing services Altor Equity Partners AB Sweden 2003 IBO 100%
2 Pronova Biocare AS
Marine Omega-3 fatty acids developer, 
producer and wholesaler Ferd AS Norway 2003 IBO 80.1 %
3 Roxar
Advanced metering instruments 
manufacturer x
LISME AS (Smedvig+ Lime Rock 
Partners) Norway/ US 2003 100 %
4 ErgoBluegarden AS Human resources management services Ratos AB Sweden 2003 IBO 100%
5 Collett Pharma Healthcare product wholesaler Ferd Private Equity Norway 2003 IBO 100%
6 APL AS
Advanced oil and gas offshore 
production systems producer Energivekst+Management Norway 2003 IBO 100%
7 Computas AS Enterprise software developer
Eqvitec Partners Oy + Four 
Seasons Venture Cap Finland/ Sweden 2003 IBO 58.8%
8 Plugging Specialists International Pipeline isolation technology developer
Reiten & Co Strategic Investments 
AS Norway 2003 53 %
9 Handicare
Wheelchairs manufacturer and 
wholesaler ABN Amro Capital Holdings BV the Netherlands 2003 IBO - unknown majority stake %
10 Scanpark Car Park Operator
Nordisk Parkering AB (Bridgepoint 
Capital) UK 2002 Acquisition 100%
11 Telenor Media
Publisher of online, offline telephone 
directories Texas Pacific Group Inc. USA 2001 IBO 100%
12 Dynal Biotech ASA Biotechnology development services Ratos +Nordic Capital AB Sweden 2001 IBO 100%
13 Norwegian Beverage Group AS Beverages wholesaler CVC Capital Partners Ltd) UK 2000 IBO 100%
14 Kongsberg Automotive ASA Automotive components manufacturer x
Vikaberg Industri AS (Industri 
Kapital AB) Sweden 1999 IBO - unknown majority stake %
15 Dynoplast AS Plastic packaging CVC Capital Partners Ltd UK 1999 IBO 75%
16 Helly Hansen Outdoor clothing manufacturer Investcorp Luxembourg 1997 70 %
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t+3 t+2 t+1 t t-1 t-2 t+3 t+2 t+1 t t-1 t-2
1 Lindorff Holding AS 2003 704 225 723 738 767 046 697 724 636 503 116 690 151 623 163 764 176 454 106 996
2 Pronova Biocare AS 2003 603 593 466 827 320 480 265 581 221 407 211 620 46 823 10 127 -8 950 -15 986
3 Roxar 2003 806 259 623 997 578 463 534 291 527 113 69 500 33 696 43 905 30 455
4 ErgoBluegarden AS 2003 317 120 308 141 304 081 322 041 301 748 44 048 34 851 26 972 32 784 14 574
5 Collett Pharma 2003 315 849 304 775 242 800 227 300 193 700 34 755 16 146 18 501 14 300 11 800
6 APL AS 2003 1 032 700 594 948 553 486 439 916 358 248 77 039 47 060 7 970 21 160 34 249
7 Computas AS 2003 97 464 92 229 124 441 121 399 7 697 12 874 9 417 -13 618
8 Plugging Specialists Intl AS 2003 129 086 189 618 107 375 35 790 57 799 -17 724 22 470 18 458 8 089 11 363
9 Handicare 2003 321 834 297 770 283 944 279 626 222 043 24 846 20 516 24 022 10 822 3 686
10 Scanpark AS 2002 95 342 81 478 76 467 72 071 48 524 27 068 5 148 701 4 145 3 892 2 023 2 309
11 Telenor Media 2001 1 525 301 1 569 564 1 552 339 1 575 514 1 434 310 1 879 658 681 352 740 991 613 950 448 549 402 467 473 862
12 Dynal Biotech ASA 2001 303 681 359 950 309 915 219 421 212 354 175 741 103 403 152 043 100 660 47 351 66 509 20 544
13 Norwegian Beverage Group AS 2000 15 859 29 290 25 378 19 553 5 221 -460 14 756 25 317 18 126 -4 972
14 Kongsberg Automotive ASA 1999 384 278 431 734 490 563 464 549 451 813 17 024 19 903 33 358 13 658 8 856
15 Dynoplast AS 1999 590 900 550 700 572 000 630 400 577 100 3 486 12 611 -29 115 21 875 24 007
16 Helly Hansen 1997 215 000 212 000 226 000 208 000 216 000 25 994 19 992 40 996 -3 994 16 006
No Target company Year t
Turnover(1000NOK) EBIT (1000NOK)
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t+3 t+2 t+1 t t-1 t-2 t+3 t+2 t+1 t t-1 t-2
1 Lindorff Holding AS 2003 16,57 20,95 21,35 25,29 16,81 0,21 0,22 0,21 0,18 0,34
2 Pronova Biocare AS 2003 35,06 10,03 3,16 -3,37 -7,22 0,26 0,27 0,17 0,18 0,2
3 Roxar 2003 8,62 5,4 7,59 5,70 0,04 0,55 0,63 0,66 0,66 0,59
4 ErgoBluegarden AS 2003 13,89 11,31 8,87 10,18 4,83 0,33 0,4 0,54 0,44 0,4
5 Collett Pharma 2003 11,00 5,30 7,62 6,29 6,09 0,42 0,38
6 APL AS 2003 7,46 7,91 1,44 4,81 9,56 0,21 0,46 0,48 0,63 0,7
7 Computas AS 2003 7,90 13,96 7,57 -11,22 0,1 0,1 0,34 0,33
8 Plugging Specialists International AS 2003 -13,73 11,85 17,19 22,6 19,66 0,62 0,47 0,46 0,3 0,24
9 Handicare 2003 7,72 6,89 8,46 3,87 1,66 0,1 0,32 0,37 0,48 0,5
10 Scanpark AS 2002 5,4 0,86 5,42 5,4 4,17 8,53 0,71 0,87 0,75 0,73 0,68 0,68
11 Telenor Media 2001 44,67 47,21 39,55 28,47 28,06 25,21 0,46 0,1 0,1 0,11 0,13
12 Dynal Biotech ASA 2001 34,05 42,24 32,48 21,58 31,32 11,69 0,23 0,32 0,31 0,24 0,23
13 Norwegian Beverage Group AS 2000 -2,9 50,38 99,76 92,7 -95,23 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,14
14 Kongsberg Automotive ASA 1999 4,43 4,61 6,8 2,94 1,96 0,26 0,27 0,4
15 Dynoplast AS 1999 0,59 2,29 -5,09 3,47 4,16 0,27 0,26 0,22
16 Helly Hansen 1997 12,09 9,43 18,14 -1,92 7,41 0,15 0,19 0,22 0,59 0,19
EBIT-margin Equity-margin (Eq/tot.cap)
No Target company Year t
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2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 Lindorff Holding AS 704 225 723 738 767 046 697 724 636 503 116 690 151 623 163 764 176 454 106 996
Intrum Justitia AS 92 636 95 047 108 551 119 198 123 215 -8 170 -2 424 2 627 9 905 18 433
AKTIV KAPITALADMINISTRASJON AS 63 136 64 227 72 813 75 290 83 503 30 993 27 136 27 822 23 882 30 395
Aktiv Kapital Norge AS 150 012 159 111 114 984 76 903 55 871 25 757 42 705 39 681 19 679 17 437
2 Pronova Biocare AS 603 593 466 827 320 480 265 581 221 407 211 620 46 823 10 127 -8 950 -15 986
NORETYL AS 640 464 547 905 554 522 553 981 564 676 51 045 17 643 37 707 55 730 40 148
OLEON SCANDINAVIA AS 96 893 95 150 113 125 279 875 228 419 -6 550 7 602 3 371 -14 721 -7 446
International Paper (Norway) AS 141 043 210 207 176 397 186 736 203 213 -66 713 2 670 2 981 16 862 19 671
3 Roxar 806 259 623 997 578 463 534 291 527 113 69 500 33 696 43 905 30 455
PARK AIR SYSTEMS AS 375 277 342 780 384 358 316 467 290 992 32 386 37 466 31 133 -25 476 -34 046
NAVICO EGERSUND AS 188 091 174 743 192 096 190 779 164 593 40 646 23 171 30 409 34 645 28 919
Simrad Optronics ASA 215 814 184 829 165 422 114 058 111 214 11 287 12 310 8 288 4 209 4 526
4 ErgoBluegarden AS 317 120 308 141 304 081 322 041 301 748 44 048 34 851 26 972 32 784 14 574
CA NORWAY AS 335 320 301 457 215 462 277 422 298 337 176 846 131 647 115 126 37 641 30 794 42 424 -78 307
IFS NORGE AS 266 788 270 751 262 489 254 823 309 072 5 149 4 576 15 697 13 404 17 586
SAP NORGE AS 446 880 374 433 274 234 276 842 217 094 42 632 21 380 12 341 11 877 -6 274
5 Collett Pharma 315 849 304 775 242 800 227 300 193 700 34 755 16 146 18 501 14 300 11 800
SANOFI-AVENTIS NORGE AS 230 444 239 930 251 223 258 485 234 147 30 488 7 174 19 696 23 005 -1 264
ABBOTT NORGE AS 369 091 338 129 273 995 249 750 220 848 18 085 33 847 10 823 16 459 6 515
Medeco AS 225 138 254 883 250 097 259 284 265 767 10 739 4 919 -2 851 6 897 3 960
6 APL AS 1 032 700 594 948 553 486 439 916 358 248 77 039 47 060 7 970 21 160 34 249
Kitron AS 1 088 936 1 009 613 964 907 1 114 047 1 242 379 -39 202 -14 740 31 842 12 812 -13 418
Cowi AS 561 250 470 387 431 808 400 036 444 402 443 740 37 660 25 589 10 061 -4 680 -27 597 5 236
RAMBØLL NORGE AS 474 562 411 317 395 531 334 393 303 190 33 836 30 725 30 377 28 022 22 951
7 Computas AS 97 464 92 229 124 441 121 399 7 697 12 874 9 417 -13 618
CISCO SYSTEMS NORWAY AS 106 069 95 644 109 475 137 603 169 265 9 673 10 320 9 940 13 870 13 812
Proact IT Norge 153 978 139 092 137 799 142 580 174 735 -6 298 1 196 2 205 -43 2 970
Bouvet ASA 220 432 154 033 130 051 128 726 154 484 22 396 12 400 6 659 -1 300 -33 029
8 Plugging Specialists International AS 129 086 189 618 107 375 35 790 57 799 -17 724 22 470 18 458 8 089 11 363
VAN OORD NORWAY AS 224 887 186 788 122 754 84 049 148 842 13 021 32 651 29 068 11 036 47 778
Petrotech AS 70 622 55 744 67 816 64 225 57 116 6 151 4 119 6 307 9 383 9 773
SEMCO MARITIME DRIFT AS 119 115 110 400 109 048 96 715 100 741 7 361 6 216 7 961 8 936 1 541
9 Handicare 321 834 297 770 283 944 279 626 222 043 24 846 20 516 24 022 10 822 3 686
MEDECO AS 225 138 254 883 250 097 259 284 265 767 10 739 4 919 -2 851 6 897 3 960
FARMAGON AS 453 245 301 151 263 482 101 707 93 655 10 969 994 2 793 -742 -3 212
AVENTIS PHARMA AS 230 444 239 930 251 223 258 485 234 147 30 488 7 174 19 696 23 005 -1 264
No Target company
Turnover(1000NOK) EBIT (1000NOK)
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2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
1 Lindorff Holding AS 16,57 20,95 21,35 25,29 16,81 0,21 0,22 0,21 0,18 0,34
Intrum Justitia AS -8,82 -2,55 2,42 8,31 14,96 0,25 0,19 0,22 0,23 0,26
AKTIV KAPITALADMINISTRASJON AS 49,09 42,25 38,21 31,72 36,4 0,2 0,16 0,12 0,3 0,31
Aktiv Kapital Norge AS 17,17 26,84 34,51 25,59 31,21 0,11 0,08 0,08 0,32 0,38
2 Pronova Biocare AS 35,06 10,03 3,16 -3,37 -7,22 0,26 0,27 0,17 0,18 0,2
NORETYL AS 7,97 3,22 6,80 10,06 7,11 0,3 0,31 0,35 0,9 0,92
OLEON SCANDINAVIA AS -6,76 7,99 2,98 -5,26 -3,26 0,69 0,76 0,74 0,59 0,56
International Paper (Norway) AS -47,30 1,27 1,69 9,03 9,68 0,25 0,7 0,55 0,57 0,31
3 Roxar 8,62 5,4 7,59 5,70 0,04 0,55 0,63 0,66 0,66 0,59
PARK AIR SYSTEMS AS 8,63 10,93 8,1 -8,05 -11,7 0,35 0,29 0,18 -0,06 0,09
NAVICO EGERSUND AS 21,61 13,26 15,83 18,16 17,57 0,58 0,58 0,51 0,48 0,4
Simrad Optronics ASA 5,23 6,66 5,01 3,69 4,07 0,32 0,45 0,39 0,38 0,56
4 ErgoBluegarden AS 13,89 11,31 8,87 10,18 4,83 0,33 0,4 0,54 0,44 0,4
CA NORWAY AS 39,26 38,19 17,47 11,10 14,22 -44,28 0,28 0,13 0,2 0,28 0,28 0,09
IFS NORGE AS 1,93 1,69 5,98 5,26 5,69 0,45 0,38 0,36 0,32 0,25
SAP NORGE AS 9,54 5,71 4,50 4,29 -2,89 0,32 0,4 0,48 0,44 0,53
5 Collett Pharma 11,00 5,30 7,62 6,29 6,09 0,42 0,38
SANOFI-AVENTIS NORGE AS 13,23 2,99 7,84 8,9 -0,54 0,39 0,52 0,42 0,28 0,16
ABBOTT NORGE AS 4,9 10,01 3,95 6,59 2,95 0,53 0,49 0,36 0,31 0,16
Medeco AS 4,77 1,93 -1,14 2,66 1,49 0,17 0,15 0,15 0,17 0,18
6 APL AS 7,46 7,91 1,44 4,81 9,56 0,21 0,46 0,48 0,63 0,7
Kitron AS -3,6 -1,46 3,3 1,15 -1,08 0,13 0,28 0,29 0,23 0,22
Cowi AS 6,71 5,44 2,33 -1,17 -6,21 1,18 0,12 0,31 0,26 0,24 0,26 0,38
RAMBØLL NORGE AS 7,13 7,47 7,68 8,38 7,57 0,28 0,29 0,35 0,33 0,38
7 Computas AS 7,90 13,96 7,57 -11,22 0,1 0,1 0,34 0,33
CISCO SYSTEMS NORWAY AS 9,12 10,79 9,08 10,08 8,16 0,63 0,61 0,46 0,52 0,4
Proact IT Norge -4,09 0,86 1,6 -0,03 1,7 0,25 0,23 0,23 0,17 0,16
Bouvet ASA 10,16 8,05 5,12 -1,01 -21,38 0,45 0,33 0,45 0,27 0,18
8 Plugging Specialists International AS -13,73 11,85 17,19 22,6 19,66 0,62 0,47 0,46 0,3 0,24
VAN OORD NORWAY AS 5,79 17,48 23,68 13,13 32,1 0,46 0,66 0,16 -0,05 -0,17
Petrotech AS 8,71 7,39 9,3 14,61 17,11 0,23 0,56 0,55 0,51 0,48
SEMCO MARITIME DRIFT AS 6,18 5,63 7,30 9,24 1,53 0,1 0,3 0,29 0,31 0,32
9 Handicare 7,72 6,89 8,46 3,87 1,66 0,1 0,32 0,37 0,48 0,5
MEDECO AS 4,77 1,93 -1,14 2,66 1,49 0,17 0,15 0,15 0,17 0,18
FARMAGON AS 2,42 0,33 1,06 -0,73 -3,43 0,19 0,14 0,16 0,22 0,2
AVENTIS PHARMA AS 13,23 2,99 7,84 8,9 -0,54 0,39 0,52 0,42 0,28 0,16
Equity-margin (Eq/tot.cap)
No Target company
EBIT-margin
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2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
10 Scanpark AS 95 342 81 478 76 467 72 071 48 524 27 068 5 148 701 4 145 3 892 2 023 2 309
Carpark AS 84 636 78 318 75 606 68 945 69 712 66 378 7 262 4 323 5 255 2 282 1 987 3 053
Center Park AS 107 393 100 623 87 536 60 016 57 380 55 567 1 622 -3 220 175 1 488 4 831 3 056
Interpark AS 13 940 14 383 12 594 11 430 12 565 14 926 3 393 4 594 2 346 1 779 2 396 3 224
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
11 Telenor Media 1 525 301 1 569 564 1 552 339 1 575 514 1 434 310 1 879 658 681 352 740 991 613 950 448 549 402 467 473 862
Hjemmet Mortensen 1 101 309 1 082 483 1 040 801 1 085 503 1 034 001 993 534 258 918 229 919 166 424 91 291 101 952 97 068
Aftenposten AS 1 878 031 1 931 565 1 991 281 2 119 324 2 234 609 2 061 786 6 949 14 873 19 315 38 148 161 562 123 707
J.W. Cappelens Forlag A/S 593 276 602 995 591 817 560 786 563 577 569 700 30 376 31 537 34 799 18 169 22 487 35 321
12 Dynal Biotech ASA 303 681 359 950 309 915 219 421 212 354 175 741 103 403 152 043 100 660 47 351 66 509 20 544
KEMETYL AS 64 249 58 143 56 944 59 548 45 060 36 001 5 082 4 210 5 005 3 996 1 036 2 012
NOPCO PAPER TECHNOLOGY AS 244 187 228 927 221 095 207 485 215 363 271 015 49 936 45 213 40 947 35 812 45 829 40 842
RESCON MAPEI AS 231 184 199 325 210 026 182 968 151 980 148 405 17 639 7 176 8 065 6 367 -7 173 5 417
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
13 Norwegian Beverage Group AS 15 859 29 290 25 378 19 553 5 221 -460 14 756 25 317 18 126 -4 972
Vinarius AS 52 142 46 670 39 221 38 412 32 830 14 063 2 127 1 913 1 745 1 913 1 737 -963
AMKA SAGA AS 26 885 20 556 17 786 15 262 14 196 10 739 2 691 2 109 1 186 945 1 367 373
Winetailor AS 88 133 70 596 63 058 34 792 26 095 18 609 2 159 3 382 1 816 609 1 229 320
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997
14 Kongsberg Automotive ASA 384 278 431 734 490 563 464 549 451 813 17 024 19 903 33 358 13 658 8 856
DEFA AS 224 111 228 441 258 693 267 676 256 245 61 205 65 243 83 170 80 918 42 793
TI GROUP AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS AS 386 173 374 059 417 257 351 051 318 168 -4 480 4 676 12 601 12 673 10 881
HYDRO ALUMINIUM STRUCTURES AS 1 374 240 1 136 752 1 053 657 959 652 1 066 230 9 757 -2 728 -32 137 1 631 31 774
15 Dynoplast AS 590 900 550 700 572 000 630 400 577 100 3 486 12 611 -29 115 21 875 24 007
JACKON AS 263 405 250 162 263 874 225 865 190 921 18 017 30 595 11 347 16 578 11 952
Stenqvist AS 145 690 137 704 121 508 106 498 95 750 5 259 3 801 1 640 9 968 5 103
Vefi AS 68 050 58 634 55 280 56 664 54 642 14 889 -17 895 -2 897 4 448 5 481
2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
16 Helly Hansen 215 000 212 000 226 000 208 000 216 000 25 994 19 992 40 996 -3 994 16 006
Herrcon AS 383 258 372 259 365 444 342014 315228 1 265 1 526 2 193 2 018 2 270
JC JEANS & CLOTHES AS 249 082 208 700 177 373 143784 82337 1 320 -230 1 047 1 035 354
BTX Norge 237 488 195 384 158 247 133 067 112786 21 136 24 677 20 604 14 637 12 328
No Target company
Turnover(1000NOK) EBIT (1000NOK)
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2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
10 Scanpark AS 5,4 0,86 5,42 5,4 4,17 8,53 0,71 0,87 0,75 0,73 0,68 0,68
Carpark AS 8,58 5,52 6,95 3,31 2,85 4,6 0,1 0,07 0,05 0,04 0,1 0,1
Center Park AS 1,51 -3,2 0,2 2,48 8,42 5,5 0,17 0,16 0,26 0,25 0,32 0,36
Interpark AS 24,34 31,94 18,63 15,56 19,07 21,6 0,1 0,1 0,41 0,23 0,22 0,33
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
11 Telenor Media 44,67 47,21 39,55 28,47 28,06 25,21 0,46 0,1 0,1 0,11 0,13
Hjemmet Mortensen 23,51 21,24 15,99 8,41 9,86 9,77 0,14 0,13 0,16 0,22 0,47
Aftenposten AS 0,37 0,77 0,97 1,8 7,23 6 0,48 0,48 0,46 0,45 0,4
J.W. Cappelens Forlag A/S 5,12 5,23 5,88 3,24 3,99 6,2 0,71 0,64 0,54 0,44 0,46
12 Dynal Biotech ASA 34,05 42,24 32,48 21,58 31,32 11,69 0,23 0,32 0,31 0,24 0,23
KEMETYL AS 7,91 7,24 8,79 6,71 2,3 5,59 0,22 0,25 0,24 0,1 0,05
NOPCO PAPER TECHNOLOGY AS 20,45 19,75 18,52 17,26 21,28 15,07 0,34 0,35 0,35 0,38 0,4
RESCON MAPEI AS 7,63 3,60 3,84 3,48 -4,72 3,65 0,31 0,28 0,3 0,25 0,22
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
13 Norwegian Beverage Group AS -2,9 50,38 99,76 92,7 -95,23 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,14
Vinarius AS 4,08 4,1 4,45 4,98 5,29 -6,85 0,06 0,1 0,06 0,04
AMKA SAGA AS 10,01 10,26 6,67 6,19 9,63 3,47 0,35 0,41 0,46 0,49
Winetailor AS 2,45 4,79 2,88 1,75 4,71 1,72 0,1 0,11 0,11 0,18
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997
14 Kongsberg Automotive ASA 4,43 4,61 6,8 2,94 1,96 0,26 0,27 0,4
DEFA AS 27,31 28,56 32,15 30,23 16,7 0,27 0,25 0,27
TI GROUP AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS AS -1,16 1,25 3,02 3,61 3,42 0,04 0,15 0,23
HYDRO ALUMINIUM STRUCTURES AS 0,71 -0,24 -3,05 0,17 2,98 0,24 0,23 0,25
15 Dynoplast AS 0,59 2,29 -5,09 3,47 4,16 0,27 0,26 0,22
JACKON AS 6,84 12,23 4,3 7,34 6,26 0,64 0,6 0,62
Stenqvist AS 3,61 2,76 1,35 9,36 5,33 0,33 0,3 0,3
Vefi AS 21,88 -30,52 -5,24 7,85 10,03 0,23 -0,19 0,17
2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
16 Helly Hansen 12,09 9,43 18,14 -1,92 7,41 0,15 0,19 0,22 0,59 0,19
Herrcon AS 0,33 0,41 0,6 0,59 0,72 0,26 0,32 0,29 0,27 0,28
JC JEANS & CLOTHES AS 0,53 -0,11 0,59 0,72 0,43 0,05 0,07 0,07 0,11 0,12
BTX Norge 8,90 12,63 13,02 11,00 10,93 0,1 0,10 0,23 0,39 0,28
No Target company
EBIT-margin Equity-margin (Eq/tot.cap)
 
 
